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1. Introduction 
Wittgenstein’s contributions to philosophy include numerous remarks that indicate his 
attitude towards science and, in particular, the relation between science and philosophy. 
Whilst Wittgenstein’s views are not anti-science they do convey a staunch anti-scientism; 
indeed, he was ‘certainly the least scientistic of philosophers’ according to Bernard 
Williams (2000: 493). Scientism, as I will focus on it, generally connotes an attitude of 
over-reliance and overconfidence in scientific methods as the exclusive routes to authentic 
knowledge in any field of inquiry.1 In what follows I suggest that Wittgenstein’s anti-
scientism is, however, consistent with a form of naturalism.   
 It has been argued that scientism reflects a particular ideological orientation, one 
that cannot be warranted by scientific practice itself but is nevertheless committed to the 
epistemic superiority of such practice (Williams and Robinson 2015: 3). This orientation 
both reflects and fuels a pervasive (if not universal) cultural tendency which, following 
Williams and Robinson (2015: 6-7), can be generally characterized according to the 
following tenets:2 
 
1. Only scientific knowledge counts as real, warranted or genuine knowledge;  
2. The epistemology and metaphysics of natural science is appropriate for all 
sciences, including social and human science;  
3. Science can plausibly aspire to provide complete answers to any question or 
problem that humanity faces.  
 
These are accompanied by a fourth claim, one that is implicit in the other three and goes 
beyond the expression of over-confidence towards what scientific inquiry can achieve:  
 
4. Scientism at least implicitly makes substantive – typically materialist – 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the world such that it can be the 
object of scientific understanding in the first place. 
 
As such scientism requires a naturalist metaphysics. In one sense this is right but it is 
important to be clear about precisely which sense that is. This matters because 
‘naturalism’ admits of a variety of interpretations, some of which are deeply anti-
Wittgensteinian and some of which are not.3 A different interpretation of naturalism is 
not only consistent with but arguably captures certain aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy.  
 One assumption that I think could be misleading in this context is that 
Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism is entailed by his alleged anti-naturalism. That would indeed 
follow if the naturalism in question were already a form of proto-scientism. But there are 
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Wittgensteinian reasons to avoid this assumption, his remarks indicating a form of 
naturalism unlike the reductive or restrictive kind that leads to scientism.  
In the next section I provide some details about naturalism, the relation with 
scientism, and recent attempts to articulate a non-reductive form of naturalism. The 
following sections then discuss ‘description’ in the context of naturalistic approaches and 
I consider a recent form of apparently non-reductive, less scientistic, naturalism – Huw 
Price’s ‘subject naturalism’. I suggest that Wittgenstein’s position is, whilst naturalist, 
distinctive. 
 
 
2. Naturalism and scientism 
Naturalism is a view about the relation between science and philosophy, one that 
privileges the metaphysical and epistemological status of science. As such naturalism is 
usually understood as a view that regards philosophy as constrained in various ways by 
scientific methods and results. According to such a view, philosophical inquiry and the 
questions it pursues typically need to be framed in a way that makes understanding those 
questions and what would constitute answers to them intelligible from a scientific point 
of view. Thus scientism could be construed as an especially strong form of naturalism: the 
relevant constraint is not just that philosophical inquiry ought to proceed in light of 
natural science, but that philosophy must itself be part of science if it can contribute to 
the ways in which we investigate and come to enjoy genuine knowledge of the world. This 
would have significant implications for how we characterize the nature of explanation and 
understanding quite generally across the natural and human sciences since, according to 
scientism, any genuine explanation or form of understanding must cohere with the 
scientifically described world and the methods deemed acceptable to investigate it. The 
influence of scientism, as Wittgenstein would have acknowledged, often manifests at the 
level of cultural attitudes and sensibilities rather than explicitly considered theoretical 
views. In philosophy, however, scientism has had a more overt impact. 
 Consider Russell’s view. Russell suggested that we should adopt the ‘method of 
science’ in philosophy as a condition of achieving knowledge and that ‘solid and durable 
progress’ can be achieved in philosophy once this approach is embraced (Russell 1963: 
93).4 Progress in philosophy, then, would be driven by progress in science supported by 
epistemic virtues such as ‘patience and modesty’. Such virtues are, nevertheless, 
underpinned by a confidence characteristic of scientism:  
 
Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and 
what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know (Russell 1998: 45)  
 
This confidence compels us, according to Russell, to ‘abandon the hope of solving many 
of the more ambitious and humanly interesting problems of traditional philosophy’ 
(Russell 1963: 93). This consequence is, arguably, disastrous for philosophy and other 
forms of inquiry through which we seek to understand ourselves and the world. An 
important theme in Wittgenstein’s work is a deep opposition to scientistic confidence, in 
part because it obscures what is otherwise important subject matter and also because it 
requires an attitude toward the nature of philosophical practice that he thought 
profoundly misguided. A problem with scientistic confidence is that it abolishes forms of 
understanding that are relevant to engaging with humanly interesting problems. Or it 
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abolishes forms of understanding that are needed to even render humanly interesting 
problems intelligible at all, let alone pursue them.  
A scientistic assumption is that progress in philosophy is a matter of providing solutions 
to problems by the discovery of previously unknown facts. But the scientistic error here is 
not just an ontological mistake where the wrong kinds of facts are identified. For 
Wittgenstein in particular, a problem with scientism is that it imposes an entirely 
inappropriate structure on philosophical activity; it is the attitude behind the search for 
facts in the first place that is mistaken, an attitude that is centrally expressed in coming to 
adopt the scientific method in philosophy.  
 Wittgenstein’s early writings express the view that philosophy is independent of 
the natural sciences, a view that largely remained in later work albeit for different reasons 
and with different implications.5 Whilst ethics according to the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus could not be investigated in any empirical or scientific way nor even articulated 
in language at all, the very point of the Tractatus was nevertheless an ‘ethical one’, a point 
invisible to the realm of scientific investigation.6 Arguably there is no shift of principle in 
Wittgenstein’s later work with regard to the independence of philosophy from science, 
although different reasons are considered as to why philosophical and natural scientific 
inquiry are autonomous. In 1929, a time when Wittgenstein’s thought was in transition 
from the ideas that dominated the Tractatus, ethics was nonetheless regarded as 
‘supernatural’ and quite outside the subject matter and methodology of scientific 
investigation (LE 7). In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’, for instance, one contrast that 
Wittgenstein seemed to have in mind was between different ways of regarding the world, 
or aspects of it, and, consequently, different ways in which our knowledge and 
understanding can be enhanced. He writes in the concluding parts of that lecture that 
ethics cannot be a science nor part of any science and thus ‘does not add to our 
knowledge in any sense’ (LE 12).  
 In part this reflects Russell’s view about the steady accumulation of facts and the 
subsequent growth of scientific understanding on the one hand, and what is deemed 
essential to ethical thought and practice on the other.7According to Russell, and a view 
still persistent in contemporary moral philosophy, the essence of ethical discourse is the 
expression of ‘desire’ (Russell 1998: 43). For Wittgenstein, ethics is independent of ‘facts’ 
which, as he puts in the lecture, are all on the ‘same level’: under one kind of description 
the ‘facts’ of a murder are on the same level as the ‘facts’ about why a stone falls to the 
ground. In contrast, ethics is ‘intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matters’ 
and so occupies a distinct level.  
The motivation to regard ethics as supernatural comes, I think, from the context 
which informed Russell’s scientism: that the proper contrast to what is ‘natural’ and what 
can be investigated naturalistically is ‘supernatural’. Whilst this seems to be the view 
suggested by Wittgenstein’s early writings, it is one amongst others that is retracted in 
later work such as the Philosophical Investigations. Although Wittgenstein’s conception of 
philosophical practice had no place for the idea that we can advance in philosophy by 
accumulating facts, he did not thereby conclude that philosophy was supernatural; 
neither did he conclude that we should be suspicious of facts as such.  
I do not think that this alleged independence implies that Wittgenstein adopts a 
kind of non-naturalism. In my view Wittgenstein came to elaborate a distinctive kind of 
naturalism, one that helps bring into view the inadequacies of scientism and the error of 
supposing that scientific naturalism has a privileged status with regard to what counts as 
reality and to how we might investigate it.8 Furthermore, the relevant form of naturalism 
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can help expose a (scientistic) tendency to equate what is not scientific with what is 
supernatural. That there is in Wittgenstein a distinctive kind of naturalism suggests that 
we ought to distinguish between his opposition to scientism on the one hand from his 
relation to naturalism on the other. In particular this can help expose a mistaken 
assumption that one can infer Wittgenstein’s (or anyone else’s) anti-naturalism from 
remarks that are explicitly anti-scientism. This assumption makes the mistake of 
preserving the thing that needs questioning, the idea that scientism is an intensified and 
pervasive version of naturalism. The point should be familiar from the work of those 
seeking to articulate and defend non-scientistic forms of naturalism: one can be critical of 
scientism without being critical of naturalism.9  
 The issue of elucidating a naturalism that contrasts with the orthodox reductive 
variety has been the subject of some recent debate. One candidate is a naturalism that is 
incorporated under the banner of ‘liberal naturalism’ as developed by, for example, John 
McDowell, amongst a number of others.10 McDowell uses a variety of terms to identify a 
restrictive or reductive naturalism which grants existence only to whatever the natural 
sciences say exists. This would be ‘neo-Humean naturalism’, ‘empiricistic naturalism’ and 
‘bald naturalism’.11 Alternatively, a so-called ‘relaxed naturalism’ extends more widely 
than its scientistic counterpart and includes but is not restricted to the idea of nature as it 
is conceived by the natural sciences (e.g. McDowell 1996: 89). Such naturalism, as we 
might expect, is motivated by a view about the relation between science and philosophy. 
In its liberal mode, naturalism is not anti-science but it is anti-scientism. What liberal 
naturalism promises is a way between the disjunction of scientism on the one hand and 
supernaturalism on the other. In doing so, it opens a potential space between naturalism 
and scientism such that former need not be simply a milder version of the latter. It seems 
right to say that Wittgenstein’s naturalism is ‘liberal’ (e.g., MacArthur 2009) but this 
needs considerable clarification which I cannot provide here. As I discuss below, there are 
versions of non-reductive naturalism that are not consistent with Wittgenstein’s views. 
 
 
3. Explanation/description 
Wittgenstein writes that a distinctive current in ‘modern thought’ is an irresistible but 
misleading tendency ‘to ask and answer questions in the way science does’ – the road to 
‘darkness’ as he puts it in the Blue Book, for example. Wittgenstein understands the way 
science operates to at least involve forms of reductionism, a method of ‘reducing the 
explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural 
laws’ (BB 18). In part this methodological tendency reflects a modern ‘craving for 
generality’, according to which the explanatory aspirations of natural-scientific 
investigation have become extended to cover inquiry as such and, presumably, affect how 
we search for answers and find particular questions pressing. Wittgenstein puts this point 
in another way. Rather than referring to a ‘craving for generality’ he suggests an 
alternative: ‘the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case’ (BB 18). What 
constitutes ‘the particular case’ is not, however, an individual instance of word use or 
concept application as if each particular case was detached from its place in a wider 
practice. The details of particular cases are crucial because they illuminate a cluster of 
features that form part of but do not exhaust the features in light of which we understand 
and make use of a word or concept.  
 In the context of philosophical inquiry the craving for generality is mistaken since, 
as he says just after the lines quoted, the philosopher’s task should not involve any kind 
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of reduction and nor should she be trying to explain anything: philosophy is, instead, 
‘purely descriptive’. In these remarks in the Blue Book about modern thought, 
Wittgenstein is interested in our treatment of ‘natural phenomena’, as he puts it, but 
where such phenomena constitute a rich and diverse subject matter. ‘Natural 
phenomena’ covers much more than, as G.E. Moore put it in 1903, ‘the subject matter of 
the natural sciences and also of psychology’ (1956: 4). Moore’s stipulation dominated 
twentieth century moral philosophy and is still at least implicitly very influential. But 
what it expresses is not restricted to the context of attempting to clarify ‘goodness’, one of 
Moore’s principal aims, and it reflects a general tendency to equate naturalism with 
scientific inquiry. 
 The emphasis on what is the right kind of subject matter for philosophical 
investigation and what it takes to bring that subject matter into view is a recurring theme 
which is variously treated as fundamental across Wittgenstein’s work. It is especially 
important for the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (and central in On 
Certainty), in which detail is given about on what our attention ought to be focused – ‘the 
spatial and temporal phenomenon of language’, for example, which is contrasted with a 
conception of language and meaning as a ‘phantasm’, drained of its embodied and 
diachronic character (PI §108). In that context, Wittgenstein states that empirical or 
scientific investigation is ‘not of any possible interest’, partly because such investigation is 
typically motivated by a deeper explanatory ambition which, as PI §109 famously 
recommends, should be replaced by the activity of description. The modern view expresses 
a need to ‘say something further’, a felt desire to articulate what is beyond or behind 
phenomena by adducing explanations of them (e.g. Z §313). This need can, Wittgenstein 
warns, take the form of a ‘temptation [that] is overwhelming’, producing a ‘haunting’ 
sense that only explanations can clarify and overcome a difficulty or puzzle. Descriptions 
remind us of ‘the most important facts’, facts about the meaning of words and our 
understanding that can only be faithfully characterized and thus understood in ‘the 
stream of life’ (Z §220; LW I 913).  
  Wittgenstein emphasizes the plurality of descriptive practices and of what can be 
described, a diversity that cannot be respected by an explanatory approach. Attending to 
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language is not a form of empirical 
investigation but provides an awareness of the ways that language is inseparably woven 
into our embodied existence. We ought to treat what Wittgenstein means by ‘description’ 
as having a wide scope. For example:  
 
Think how many different kinds of thing are called “description”: description of a 
body’s position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; 
description of a sensation of touch; of a mood (PI §24) 
 
Description is an activity that is expressed in a variety of ways and it involves a process of 
‘assembling reminders’ of what our words, actions and gestures mean and how they are 
entwined with our practices in particular contexts (PI §127). The kind of ‘explanation’ to 
which Wittgenstein is opposed tempts us to conceive of what it is that we are trying to 
explain as if there is something lying behind or inside utterances or actions – as it were, 
some essence that will be revealed once our (‘scientific’) explanations are the right ones. 
 Wittgenstein’s emphasis on description is intended to preserve the normativity of 
words and concepts as they are used in the ‘stream of life’. This coupling of description 
with normativity stands in contrast, on the face of it, with other influential views that 
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interpret description as a threat to the aim of recognizing and accounting for normativity. 
Wittgensteinian description is, for instance, different from how it is used by Sellars in his 
critique of empiricist epistemology. Although both Sellars and Wittgenstein are critical of 
empiricist epistemology, the former chooses ‘description’ to exemplify a mistaken 
approach whilst for the latter it is a methodological device that can help avoid it. It is 
useful to consider this difference and the related scientism that Sellars embraces in order 
to shed light on the character of Wittgenstein’s views in this context.  
 In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars considers and rejects a traditional 
empiricist account of knowledge. Sellars insists on the condition that, to count as 
knowing, a person must come to occupy a status of being justified with the ability to 
justify what they say. Sellars explains that such normative elements to knowledge are 
irreducible and that they cannot be accounted for by giving an ‘empirical description’ of 
knowledge (1997: 76). Instead, Sellars claims that the proper characterization of knowing 
involves placing it in the ‘space of reasons’, a contextualization that reflects the 
normativity essential to knowing. Now when Wittgenstein proposes that philosophical 
practice should involve description he is clearly using that term in a quite different way to 
Sellars. For Sellars, empirical description entirely fails to recognize the normativity of, 
inter alia, human agency and interpersonal regulation in what it is to achieve knowledge. 
Despite intending a different sense of description, one of Wittgenstein’s core aims in the 
Philosophical Investigations, as in Sellars’s work, is to illuminate the role of human agency 
and social practice in coming to achieve understanding. These elements can be disclosed 
through the activity of description, in Wittgenstein’s sense of ‘description’. For example, 
in one place Wittgenstein likens activities of description to ‘instruments for particular 
uses’, the contrast being with an alternative (perhaps more Sellarsian) notion of 
description which depicts merely how something looks, the result being ‘as it were idle’ 
and in a sense use-less (PI §219).12  
 To an extent both Wittgenstein and Sellars share the view that their subject 
matter can be faithfully characterized only by recognizing a relevant normative context. 
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the normative context is not, however, centrally motivated by 
a concern to characterize knowledge.13 In his later work particularly, Wittgenstein is 
interested in the limitations to our ability to justify what we say and so in order to 
illustrate how we embody forms of understanding that are ‘beyond being justified or 
unjustified’ (OC §359). This understanding is a way of being certain yet, according to a 
common interpretation, it must be of a non-epistemic form since it is external to 
justification.14 But construed outside of its narrower epistemological setting, the idiom of 
‘placing in the space of normativity’ or appreciating the irreducibly discursive context of 
words and actions is part of a broader strategy to direct attention to the lived context in 
which we think, speak and act. Wittgensteinian description enables this kind of attention, 
at least in part. If successful our interest is thus redirected from a concern with 
explanation and, a fortiori, from the attempt to ‘place’ the objects of investigation within a 
world already described by science.  
 Despite some affinity between Sellars and Wittgenstein in the context of 
characterizing aspects of our epistemic practices, there are also stark differences. In a 
passage that is often taken as emblematic of scientism, Sellars writes: ‘speaking as a 
philosopher ... in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the 
measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not’ (1997: 83). 
Sellars also writes that ‘what we call the scientific enterprise is the flowering of a 
dimension of discourse which already exists in what historians call the “prescientific 
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stage” ’ (1997: 81). This sort of remark is just what Wittgenstein would have expected of 
the ‘modern view’ and Sellars sees a crucial role for science constraining philosophy 
which Wittgenstein opposes. Although we would be right to think that philosophy is not 
itself science nor science-in-waiting, we should not, Sellars thinks, confuse that with the 
quite different and unwarranted idea that philosophy is independent of science (1997: 
80); again, a claim disputed by Wittgenstein. For present purposes, the point of drawing 
on Sellars is to help elucidate the character of Wittgensteinian description and to indicate 
how this relates to the ‘placement’ of our practices within an appropriate context. I turn 
now to address this issue in light of a recent attempt at distinguishing different kinds of 
naturalism and the relation between this and Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism.  
 
 
4. Wittgenstein, ‘subject naturalism’, and scientism 
Huw Price has drawn a contrast between what he calls ‘object naturalism’ and ‘subject 
naturalism’ (Price 2004; 2011). Briefly the distinction is this. Object naturalism, in its 
‘ontological mode’, is the view that ‘in some important sense, all there is is the world 
studied by science’. Epistemologically, object naturalism claims that any case of genuine 
knowledge is a case of scientific knowledge (2004: 73). So object naturalism assumes a 
view about what entities exist where this view is directly informed by natural scientific 
inquiry. Then, in light of this assumption, we can proceed to ask whether some candidate 
entity or property can coherently become part of that view. As Price puts it, object 
naturalism implies that in so far as philosophy is concerned with the nature of objects 
and properties of various kinds, its concern is with something in the scientifically 
described natural world or with nothing at all. The objects of philosophical investigation 
are aspects of the world-as-studied-by-science, or else they are nothing at all (Price 2004: 
73). Object naturalism is thus scientistic. Accordingly the question about whether our 
discourse concerning, for example, values, norms and intentionality can be construed 
naturalistically, is a question about whether the relevant objects that underpin that 
discourse can be located in the natural world – thus ‘a sort of thing identifiable by 
science’ (Price 2011: 188). In Price’s terminology, the central questions here are about 
whether candidate entities can be ‘placed’ in the world; these he calls ‘placement 
problems’.15 Object naturalism expresses a form of scientism since finding the question 
intelligible as to whether some object can be placed in the world assumes a substantive 
and unearned metaphysics; unearned since an account of what entities exist and the 
framework within which objects might be placed (the ‘world’) is supplied by science and is 
taken for granted. This is an example of Williams and Robinson’s fourth feature of 
scientism (see above, section 1); it implies that those entities that cannot be satisfactorily 
placed are supernatural or at least nothing about which we can have genuine 
understanding and knowledge.  
 ‘Subject naturalism’, in contrast, is not primarily a view about what entities exist, 
taking the ontology of natural science as its guide and then regarding our practices and 
discourse in light of that. Rather it claims that our principal focus ought to be on our 
human practices and modes of discourse as such, not what would constitute a 
scientifically respectable metaphysical underpinning for those practices. We should begin, 
says the subject naturalist, with ‘what science tells us about ourselves’ (Price 2004: 73). 
Broadly, science tells us that we are natural creatures, that ‘we humans (our thought and 
talk included) are surely part of the natural world’ (Price 2011: 5). On the face of it this 
sort of naturalism is liberal in the sense referred to earlier. There is no pressure to 
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demonstrate the links between our everyday conceptual practices and their scientifically 
described material bases. Instead it is our very thought and talk that is the object of 
naturalistic investigation.  
This is a seemingly Wittgensteinian idea: ‘Look on the language-game as the 
primary thing’, as he puts it (PI §656). According to Peter Winch, one of Wittgenstein’s 
most distinctive methodological characteristics is to refocus attention away from the 
object to which a concept applies and toward the persons doing the applying and (we 
might add) to the contexts within which that happens (1997: 60).16 If this sort of shift can 
be characterized in naturalistic terms, then a ‘subject naturalism’ seems to be a promising 
way to frame it. After all, the form of naturalism in question is focused on our linguistic 
and conceptual practices with no attempt to reductively ‘explain’ those practices or to 
‘place’ those objects in some disenchanted non-normative realm.  
 However, in Price’s formulation, subject naturalism retains the privileged status 
accorded to science (Macarthur 2014b). Whilst the focus may no longer be on the 
metaphysical character of that which lies behind our practices, it is nevertheless science 
that we look to as the point of departure in order to advance our understanding. Our 
primary question as subject naturalists would be: ‘What does science tell us about 
ourselves?’ According to Wittgenstein this question would be misguided, given his view 
that science and philosophy are independent. Price’s contrast between forms of 
naturalism recognizes that we can ask questions about ourselves and that such questions 
are at least as important, from a naturalist perspective, as questions that seek to locate the 
apparent objects of thought and speech in a world described according to science. And 
this refocus can, according to Price, by achieved whilst preserving the privileged status of 
science. So whilst it is our conceptual and linguistic practices themselves that become 
principal focus for the subject naturalist, the motivation is still the view that science is best 
placed to inform us about those aspects of our lives.17  
 ‘Placement problems’ typically involve those features that are part of discourse 
about ethics, minds and meaning and whose location in the scientifically described world 
needs to be demonstrated. In the context of reflecting on the nature of our ethical 
thought and practice, Simon Blackburn provides a good example of what a placement 
problem looks like: 
 
 The natural world is the world revealed by the senses, and described by the 
 natural sciences: physics, chemistry, and notably biology, including evolutionary 
 theory. However we think of it, ethics seems to fit badly into that world ... the 
 problem is one of finding room for ethics, or of placing ethics within the 
 disenchanted, non-ethical order which we inhabit, and of which we are a part. 
 (Blackburn 1998: 48-9) 
 
In the wider context, Blackburn’s concern is to provide an account of ethical thought and 
practice that coheres with a scientific world-view and, in various places, Blackburn 
explains that his proposed quasi-realism in ethics has an advantage over rival meta-ethical 
views because of its naturalist credentials.18 I do not want to suggest that Blackburn is 
scientistic quite generally, but I do regard the way that Blackburn portrays the task of 
philosophical ethics here to reflect a scientistic attitude and in a way that can be 
illuminated by drawing on Wittgenstein’s critique.  
 This way of framing the problem of ‘finding room for ethics’ is scientistic to the 
extent that it prioritizes the scientific, disenchanted world as that into which the relevant 
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normative properties need to fit. Finding the problem that Blackburn highlights 
compelling in the first place requires one to comply with a world-view informed by a 
disenchanted conception of the world. That conception and its assumed primacy is a 
condition for making sense of the placement problem. The idea that we are part of a 
disenchanted, non-ethical order could mean that we are part of the universe like other 
material objects and subject to the same natural laws and causal forces. What is scientistic 
is the assumption that being part of the non-ethical world is the primary, fundamental 
way that we exist; other ways – ethical, aesthetic, religious – are considered secondary, at 
best, to that allegedly more basic existential condition.  
No doubt there are a number of forms of inquiry that require considering the 
world and what it contains as disenchanted. But ethics is, whatever else it is, an 
embodiment and an expression of our agency, of our human way of life, and it is difficult 
to see how we could find room for our humanity in an inhuman world. Of course there 
are important questions about how agency is related to physical capacities, how 
intentionality is related to neurobiology, how meaning is related to vocalizations and 
bodily gestures. These are difficult (and hardly novel) questions. What I want to highlight 
here is the particular effect of a scientistic attitude to these questions.   
 Under the sway of scientism, an ethical placement problem could take on a 
particular air of inescapability as if the particular kind of problem we face, of placing the 
ethics in the non-ethical order, is unavoidable once we have given up on supernaturalism. 
The ethical placement problem is pressing from a distinctive, if optional, perspective – yet 
scientism makes it seem mandatory. There is nothing intrinsically misleading about 
wanting to know how ethics is related to the non-ethical world. But scientistic prejudice 
operates in a way that frames the attempt at that knowledge as our singular task, as if 
tackling this placement problem is compulsory for any philosopher who has proper 
respect for scientific inquiry. The result is a distinctive kind of puzzle that emerges once a 
detached perspective is adopted, a perspective that is then gripped by the problem of how, 
for example, our ethical agency is related to the disenchanted order. The scenario is 
illustrated by Iris Murdoch, who writes of our depleted vocabulary and conceptual 
repertoire through which we now struggle to articulate and reflect on our ethical agency. 
As a result, and under the influence of scientism, a person is now regarded as ‘a brave 
naked will surrounded by an easily comprehended empirical world’ (Murdoch 1961: 18). 
This picture, potentially, threatens our ability to authentically regard ourselves in an 
evaluative context, ‘against a background of values’ rather than a background of 
dehumanized normless mechanisms.  
 As previously noted in section 3, one of Wittgenstein’s most important 
contributions to philosophy was to our understanding of agency, and not only in the 
context of reflecting on the role of social practices referred to earlier. It is central to the 
emphasis he gives to non-linguistic activity in the context of language-games, in our 
institution of and answerability to the norms that govern practices and to the idea of a 
‘grammatical investigation’. This form of agency cannot be made intelligible by scientism. 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ‘description’ is an attempt at a perspectival reorientation that 
illuminates the contexts within which our activities are meaningful.  The famous remarks 
that encourage us to ‘look at’ (e.g. PI §66, §320) the use of words and to avoid the 
(scientistic) prejudice that stands in the way is not only an encouragement to change the 
mode of apprehension so to speak, to switch from thinking and explaining to looking. In 
On Certainty Wittgenstein tells us that after justifications come to an end, as they 
inevitably will, what we are given is not a form of immediate perception of the truth of 
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propositions but insight into a form of embodied agency that underpins language-games 
(OC §204). The reorientation shows in a different light what our actions embody. ‘This is 
how I act’ is not a remark that is bound to discrete instances of, say, getting up from a 
chair in the absence of prior reflective endorsement (OC §148). When offering 
justifications for how we obey rules, reporting that ‘[t]his is simply what I do’ is not a 
concession to scepticism about rule-following once the justifications have been exhausted 
(PI §217). These remarks indicate that the relevant actions quite literally embody a form 
of life, a way of inhabiting the world that can be naturalistically construed but stands in 
direct contrast to characterizations offered from a scientistic perspective.  
 By drawing attention to the rich and diverse content of descriptions, including 
the prominence this gives to our actions, we can become furnished with a ‘sensuous 
awareness’ as Marie McGinn puts it, of phenomena as inextricably nested within human 
forms of life (2010: 347). This kind of awareness is simply unavailable from a scientistic 
perspective since it requires the point of view of an engaged participant and a way of 
understanding that is contrary to the tenets of scientistic metaphysics and epistemology. 
We could add that this awareness is not reducible to knowing that certain propositions 
are true, propositions about our linguistic and conceptual practices, for example. The 
reorientation that is needed to accomplish this awareness is arguably a reawakening of an 
attitude to ourselves and what we do in the midst of human life. That, presumably, is part 
of Wittgenstein’s view about the aim of philosophy being to clear away 
misunderstandings through illuminating what is already before our eyes (e.g. PI §129), of 
supplying ‘remarks on the natural history of human beings ... contributing observations 
which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes’ (PI §416). The 
tendency to overlook what is familiar is arguably exacerbated by a scientistic pressure to 
seek explanations of ordinary phenomena. Wittgenstein’s attitude in this context and the 
more general opposition he voices toward the idea that philosophy, like science, advances 
by accumulating more facts, is regarded as anti-naturalist because scientism distorts how 
we characterize philosophical naturalism. And this, amongst others, is one aspect of 
scientism that can be challenged.   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
P.M.S. Hacker writes of our intellectual and academic culture being ‘intoxicated with 
science and scientific explanation’ and how such a culture blocks a more hermeneutic 
understanding of ourselves and our practices (2011: 99-100). Here I have tried to show 
that whilst such a form of understanding is threatened by scientism it need not be so 
threatened by naturalism. In particular, I have suggested that we can isolate the ways that 
Wittgenstein is against scientism from the naturalist elements in some of his later work. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks against science are most profitably taken to be against scientism, 
against the tendency to take for granted the appropriateness and utility of a scientific 
attitude with regard to any questions whatsoever. This aspect of Wittgenstein’s anti-
scientism and his more positive remarks about the ineliminable role of social context and 
agency can help to reinterpret Russellian pessimism about our ability to engage with 
humanly interesting philosophical problems. The scientism that motivated that 
pessimism was counterbalanced by a form of confidence in the progress that philosophy 
could make by adopting the scientific method. But opposition to the sort of scientism 
that Russell expressed need not imply an opposition to naturalism in philosophy. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about the misleading influence of science on philosophy would 
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have this implication as long as naturalism is construed as a mild form of scientism. I 
have suggested that this is an element of scientism that should be resisted and it is also 
pertinent to clarifying an alternative form of naturalism as formulated by Price. This latter 
form, although apparently more consistent with Wittgenstein’s view about the primacy of 
our conceptual and linguistic practices, nevertheless retains natural science as the source 
of our understanding.  
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the importance of sensitivity to embodied, contextual 
practice for philosophical inquiry and self-understanding is deeply at odds with the 
aspiration to locate our practices in, and explain them in light of, the scientifically 
described world. Alongside the remarks that Wittgenstein makes against scientism, there 
are naturalistic elements in his work that express the importance of our self-
understanding in particular and the role of irreducibly normative contexts. That is at least 
one reason why Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism is still important for contemporary 
philosophy.19  
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Notes 
1 For a recent overview and critical discussion of scientism, see Williams and Robinson 2015.  
2 I have contracted these for reasons of space. Williams and Robinson’s characterisations are more 
detailed than I have presented them here. 
3 For example, David Pears writes that different kinds of naturalism share the idea that ‘the right 
method in philosophy is not to theorize about things but to describe them as we find them in 
daily life’ (1995: 411). This ‘Wittgensteinian’ naturalism clearly contrasts with other familiar 
kinds of naturalism that explicitly embrace a scientific method.  
4 See Baldwin (1975: xvi). 
5 Tractatus 4.111: ‘Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word “philosophy” must 
mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, but not beside them’. 
6 Wittgenstein described the Tractatus in this way in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker in 1919 (Janik 
and Toulmin 1973: 22).  
7 Elsewhere, Russell proposed that the potential goodness of an otherwise ‘scientific civilization’ 
could be ensured by an increase in ‘wisdom’ as a counterbalance to the increase in ‘knowledge’ 
(Russell 1949: 11). Russell writes there that: ‘Increase in science by itself is ... not enough to 
guarantee genuine progress’, thus recognizing that progress of civilization is different from 
progress in science (and philosophy).  
8 Others have argued that Wittgenstein adopts a form of naturalism, albeit of a kind quite unlike 
scientific naturalism. See, for example, Garver (1994), McGinn (1997), (2010). Kenny (2011) also 
suggests a way to distinguish between scientism and naturalism in the context of discussing 
Wittgenstein, science and faith. 
9 See, for example, the essays collected in Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (eds.) (2004; 
2010). 
10 For a presentation and discussion of ‘liberal naturalism’ see, for example, De Caro and 
Voltolini (2010). See also McDowell (1996; 1998a; 2004). 
11 Although McDowell (2002:297) himself suggests that ‘bald naturalism’ is not to be equated 
with ‘scientism’. On the place of Hume here, see Smith (2016). 
12 Cf. Zettel §311. 
13 Some suggest that Sellars’s point against description is not in any case just a point in the 
context of knowledge. Brandom, for example, writes that Sellars may as well have said that in 
characterizing ‘believing’ or ‘applying concepts’ we are not giving an empirical description but 
placing those actions in the space of reasons (Brandom 1997: 160). 
 
 
14 
 
14 The common interpretation reads passages such as On Certainty §511 to show how 
Wittgenstein deliberately avoids calling basic certainty or ‘sureness’ a form of knowledge. But 
others see nothing intrinsically illegitimate in the idea that such certainty is a form of knowledge. 
McDowell, for example, sees Wittgenstein’s main concern as one about when it is and when it is 
not appropriate to ask for the justificatory grounds for a knowledge claim, not so much about 
when it is appropriate to use the term ‘knowledge’. See McDowell (1998b: 415, n4). 
15 Thus object naturalism promises a response to what Jackson calls ‘location problems’, questions 
about whether some ‘putative features of the world’ are actually part of the fabric of reality 
(Jackson 1998: 5). 
16 See also Hertzberg (2011) for a different interpretation of Wittgenstein’s relation to naturalism, 
one that emphasizes the role of our reactions and responses.  
17 For a connected and more comprehensive discussion of the relation between Price, language 
and scientism, see Macarthur (2014a) and (2014b).  
18 See, for example, Blackburn (1988). 
19 A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Wittgenstein and Scientism’ workshop held at 
Durham University on 3rd July, 2012. Many thanks to Ian James Kidd for inviting me to 
participate and for his and Jonathon Beale’s insightful and very helpful comments on a previous 
draft of this chapter. I am also grateful to the other participants of the workshop for very 
stimulating discussion.  
 
  
